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This paper is a first attempt of looking into the impact of IT and enterprise reform on 
productivity of Chinese manufacturing firms by using large scale firm level datasets 
from 1995 to 2002. It is found that enterprise reforms captured by entry and exit of 
firms have a positive impact on aggregated productivity growth. In addition, IT plays 
relatively more important role in productivity performance of post reform enterprises, as 
compared to enterprises which are not affected by major restructuring in the course of 
Chinese state owned enterprise reforms.     
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1.  Introduction 
Rapid technological progress of IT system and its diffusion into economy have played 
more and more important role in economic growth in developed countries. New 
economy, productivity lead economic growth in the Information Age can be found, not 
only in the United States, but also in Japan and Europe (Jorgenson and Motohashi, 2003, 
OECD, 2003). However, economic impact of IT in developing countries has not been 
investigated very much, although ‘digital divide’ is one of major policy issues. This 
paper provides empirical evidences on the relationship between IT investment and 
productivity for Chinese manufacturing firms from 1995 to 2002. 
China shows outstanding economic performance since its economic reform started in 
1980’s. In these 20 years of Chinese economic development, we can observe a 
significant change of industrial structure from agriculture to manufacturing and service 
sectors. Within manufacturing sector, a shift of output from State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) to shareholding companies and foreign owned enterprises can be seen (NBS, 
2004). In this process, a significant firm level dynamics can be observed by means of 
entry and exit of enterprise and its ownership change.   
A whole process of enterprise reform by the Chinese government is targeted at 
revitalizing its economy by introducing market based competition. We cannot ignore 
this factor in analyzing the relationship between IT and firm’s performance in China. In 
order to realize economic gains from IT investment, a firm must have a good incentive 
to improve its operational efficiency and to introduce new business processes or models 
which can be applied by using IT. Therefore, it is important to investigate the impact of 
economic reform as a necessary condition that Chinese firms can gain superior 
performance by IT investments.   
This paper is a first attempt to analyze the impact of enterprise reform and IT on firm 
level productivity by using micro datasets by Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Our 
dataset is covering about 25,000 manufacturing firms from 1995 to 2002, taken from 
NBS’s Industry Statistics as well as Science and Technology Statistics. In this dataset, 
variables on inputs and outputs of conventional production function as well as IT related 
capital stock are available. In addition, since this panel data is based on census survey 
for all Large and Medium Enterprises (LMEs), the information on entry and exit from 
this dataset can be used as structural change variables for our empirical models.   
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief history of economic  3
reform in China, including SOE reform and opening market policy for stimulating FDI, 
is presented. In addition, description of data as well as a quick overview of structural 
change of Chinese manufacturing industry, focusing on firm ownership change is 
provided. A section for productivity analysis, interacting enterprise reforms and IT 
capital intensity is followed. There are a number of past studies investigating the 
relationship between SOE reform and productivity, and a literature survey is also 
provided in this section. Then, a section for regression analysis for IT and productivity, 
and the impact of economic reform on this relationship follows. Finally, this paper is 
concluded with policy implications and future research agenda.   
2.  Economic system reform and its impacts on productivity 
Many policies during economics reform that start in the end 1970s in China give more 
or less influence on ownership structure of enterprises. Early reform policy 
implemented in rural area created large number of enterprises run at town and village 
level, which latter are called as town and village enterprises (TVEs). Furthermore, open 
policy, which has been mainly characterized by more free trade and introduction of 
foreign investments, lead to emergence of businesses run by Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao-based enterprises and foreign companies in Chinese market. Before the early 
1990s foreign debts had consisted of inflow of foreign capital, but it was only from then 
the FDI took the place of foreign debts and formed main foreign investment. During his 
southern visit in 1992, Deng Xiaoping called for speeded up the economic reform and 
economic growth and brought about a boom of inflow of FDI. With strong competition 
of local government in attracting of foreign capital through such policy measures as 
favor taxes and provision land with low price for production use, the FDI achieved 
remarkable expansion, rising 4.4 billion US dollars (amount of the actually used) in 
1991 to 11.0 billion of US dollars in 1992. It keeps up increasing from then, with only 
exception for two years of 1999 and 2000 due to Asian monetary crisis, and reached 
53.5 billion of US dollars in 2003. The growing inflow of FDI into China has increase 
the importance of foreign enterprises in economy, which we will observe blow in the 
case of large and medium size enterprises. 
Emergence and gradual grow of private enterprise and individual businesses (often 
referred to as getihu) have generated a new ownership component of Chinese 
enterprises since the beginning of economic reform. While the ordinance from the 
Chinese government was issued to protect the private enterprises and getihu, and at the 
same time to normalize their management behavior in the market, state protection was  4
granted to private enterprises for the first time by constitutional amendment in 1999. 
This is result of rapid expansion of private enterprise in China since it came out and will 
certainly its further development in the future. 
Main policy measure that was taken to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before 1994 is to 
improve their poor performance by giving them more autonomy, but almost without 
touching in their status of being state-owned.
3 In 1994 the Company Law was 
established for the first time in China. And one of its consequences is start and gradually 
acceleration of transition of SOEs to shareholding enterprises, for which the state holds 
the largest share in most cases. The reform of state-owned enterprises is accelerated in 
1997. In this year, Premier Zhu Rongji announced in the 15
th Party Congress his three 
years of schedule for accelerating SOEs’ reform, which consists of measures such as 
implementation of “modern enterprise system”, allowance of more SOEs to go to 
bankrupt, more redundancy of employment in SOEs and so on. Such strict measures 
have resulted in big decline in the number of SOEs and employment working for the 
SOEs. 
In the process of SOE reforms, many of them were transformed to limited liability joint 
stock ownerships. The shares of this organization can be owned by the government as 
well as individual and institutional investors. However, in most cases, the government 
holds major share of new firms, so that this process is not fully privatization, but is 
called ‘corporatization’ under state control (Zhu, 1999). It has widely been, Qu (2003) 
for instance, argued that corporate governance change little in most of shareholding 
enterprises that are transited from SOEs, as government still take tight control of 
shareholding enterprises. There are also case studies shown how governmental 
intervention gives negative impact on shareholding enterprise (for example Watanabe, 
2002). However, these series of enterprise reforms must have significant impact on 
incentive structures inside firms for improving productivity, as compared to an era of 
centrally planning system.   
Given previous dominance of SOEs in Chinese economy and important consequences 
of reforming the SOEs to many aspects of the economy, it is not surprised that there 
have been a large body of literature devoted on enterprise reform in China Most of 
previous study have focused on efficiency consequences of enterprise reform for the 
SOEs. Jefferson et. al (2000) for instance, investigates productivity outcomes for three 
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types of enterprises: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs) and other ownership enterprises (OTEs) from 1980 to 1996. They find that 
productivity growth in OTEs is modest as compared to SOEs and COEs, and 
productivity of stock ownership enterprises was actually declined in 1990’s. Zhang et. al 
(2001) analyze impact of ownership on productivity, and find that efficiency score of 
foreign owned enterprises is the highest, and that of state owned enterprises is the 
lowest.  
There are some studies focusing on state-owned enterprises to analyze productivity 
performance. Zheng et. al (2003) uses the data of 600 SOEs from 1980 to 1994, and 
evaluate their efficiency level by using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and 
Malmquist index. The study find that, (1) the best practice SOEs are most likely to be 
found among large enterprises located in the well-developed coastal provinces, (2) wage 
incentives and capacity utilization had positive impacts on productivity growth, and (3) 
education had a significant effect on technical efficiency. Movshuk (2004) provides a 
case study of iron and steel industry, which have gone through substantial restructuring 
of SOEs. One of major findings from this study is that efficiency level of large SOEs are 
not so high as compared to smaller ones, suggesting ineffective government policy of 
merging large SOEs in this industry.   
There are few studies working on the impact of IT on firm’s performance, but some 
papers are addressing the relationship between R&D and productivity. Using data on 
8341 industrial firms from national wide, Zhang, Zhang and Zhao (2003) attempts to 
investigate ownership’s influence on research and development (R&D) and productivity 
efficiency. The main conclusion that drawn from the study is that the state sector has 
significantly lower R&D and productive efficiency than non-state sectors, and foreign 
firms perform better than domestic collective-owned and joint stock enterprises. Hu 
(2201) also shows positive link between private R&D and firm productivity while the 
direct contribution of government R&D to firm productivity is insignificant.   
Jefferson et al. (2003) uses panel data set of Chinese large and medium-size industrial 
enterprises (LMEs) from National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and the 
determinants of firm-level R&D intensity, the process of knowledge production and the 
impact of innovation on firm performance, finding positive contribution of R&D 
expenditure to new product innovation, productivity and profitability. Using the same 
rich data set, Hu and Jefferson (2004) investigates contribution of three technological 
advance, technology transfer, domestic R&D and foreign direct investment to 
productivity and knowledge production. Among the main findings of the study is that  6
technology transfer affects productivity only through its interaction with in-house R&D. 
Jefferson et al. (2004) also employs the same data set, but aims to document change in 
ownership of LMEs from 1994-1999, the link of performance with ownership and 
possible association of ownership with innovation activity, finding rapidly diversifying 
ownership structure during the period under view, with the role of SOEs being steadily 
retreating.  
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
In this paper, we analyze productivity performance of Chinese manufacturing firms in 
conjunction with market based economic reform and advancement of information 
technology. TFP growth of a firm with substantial change in its organization and 
governance mechanism is compared with that of a firm without such change to see how 
enterprise reform in China contributes to productivity growth. In addition, the 
complementarity of IT and organizational change for productivity is tested. It should be 
noted that this study analyzes relative performance of a firm with organizational change 
in manufacturing sector, instead of evaluating enterprise reform in China on its overall 
economic performance.   
The dataset used in this paper is based on NBS’s statistics on all large and medium sized 
enterprises (LMEs), which are used in Jefferson et al. (2003) and Jefferson et. al (2004). 
This dataset comes from NBS’ survey on Science and Technology Activities., which is 
conducted for all LMEs in industrial sector from 1995 to 2002. In this survey, the data for 
Industrial output and input variables come from industrial statistics. There is also the variable of 
IT capital stock, including production facility controlled by IT, as well as conventional general 
purpose computers, from S&T survey. The LMEs are defined as firms with no less than 
certain amount of physical capacity of production. The threshold point varies by 
industry, and its unit corresponds to technical characteristics of each sector, such as ‘ton’ 
for some chemicals and ‘sheets’ for some textiles.
4 There are about 25,000 samples in 
each year.   
First, descriptive statistics on ownership changes of Chinese industrial enterprises is 
provided according to this dataset. Table 1 shows ownership composition of value added 
by entire LMEs. Overall LMEs fall into seven group: (1) state-owned enterprises, (2) 
collective-owned enterprises, (3) Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan-owned enterprises 
(HK-M-T enterprises), (4) foreign-owned enterprises, (5) shareholding enterprise, (6) 
private enterprises and (7) other enterprises. The most noticeable in the table is sharp 
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decline in share of SOEs in total value added for LMEs, from 73.3 percent in 1995 to 
34.5 percent in 2002. Although differing in period and also in indicators, observation 
made here is roughly in line with those in other studies. Jefferson et al. (2004), for 
example, shows the proportion of the number of SOEs in total LMEs deceased from 
67.9 percent in 1994 to 50.6 percent in 1999.   
(Talble 1) 
Behind the substantial decline of SOEs is large increase for shareholding enterprise, 
which share of value added in the total for all types of ownership rose from 6.8 percent 
from 1995 to 33.1 percent in 2002. The substantial rise in relative importance of 
shareholding enterprises principally reflects a result of enterprise reform that intends to 
convert the SOEs to shareholding enterprises. The foreign enterprise also gained its 
share during the same period, from 7.0 percent to 15.9 percent. Similar to the foreign 
enterprise, HK-M-T enterprises also doubled its share over the period, but its share in 
2002 is below that of foreign enterprises by 6.0 percent, compared with by 2.6 percent 
in 1995. This suggests that foreign enterprises are outpacing HK-M-T enterprises. It 
should be also noted that collectives lost its share during the period under view, which 
indicates that the collectives, similar to SOEs, is contracting part in Chinese industry. 
In order to get further understanding of relative importance of SOEs and its change, we 
show in Table 2 SOEs share of value added in the total by sector. It is evident from the 
table that with exception for very few sectors and very few years, the relative 
importance of SOEs has retreated for all sectors, of which, mining and petrochemical 
industry is more noticeable. That is, SOEs share in mining, in term of value added, 
dropped from 99.2 percent in 1995 to 31.7 percent in 2002. And the figures in 
petrochemical industry are from 96.0 percent to 22.7 percent for the same period. It 
should be also noted that the biggest drop in the two industries occurred recently yeas, 
say around 2000 and 2001. In the latest year of 2002, the only sector where share of 
SOEs in total value added is above half is Food and tobacco. Evidently, this is mainly 
due to the monopoly power of the state in production of tobacco. 
(Table 2) 
These drastic structural changes in Chinese manufacturing firms are coming from 
substantial changes in firm’s organization and governance mechanism which are treated 
as entry and exit from this datasets. Table 3 shows the number of firms in our sample by 
type of firm’s ownership. The number of state owned enterprises goes down from  8
15,718 in 1995 to 7,851. On the other hand, the growing sector is stock holding 
companies (from 965 to 6,030), T-HK-M firms (from 950 to 2,479) and foreign owned 
companies (from 1,058 to 3,016). Recently the number of private companies is also 
increasing.  
(Table 3) 
According to the firm registration system in China, when major restructuring in 
business lines as well as management resources was conducted, such firm has to be 
registered as a new firm. In a process of corporatising SOE, it is typical to conduct 
restructuring in its business. In addition, some of business of SOE may be merged with 
foreign capital to come up with new joint venture companies. All of these processes are 
tracked as entry and exit of enterprises in our samples. Therefore, it is reasonably to say 
that substantial amount of entries of exits of enterprises in our sample are consequences 
of enterprise reforms.  
The diffusion of IT in Chinese manufacturing sector can be also analyzed based on this 
dataset. The 1990’s is an era of IT revolution not only in developed countries, and also 
in developing countries including China. Tremendous technological progress in IT as 
well as advancement of Internet must have a non negligible impact on Chinese 
manufacturing firms. In our dataset, IT capital is defined as production facilities 
controlled by IT system. The definition is broader than conventional measures for IT, 
such as the stock of general purpose computers, software and communication 
equipment. Figure 1 shows a trend of the size of total capital stock and IT capital stock, 
as well as the ratio of IT stock to total stock. We can see consistent increase in the size 
of both capital stocks, while the IT intensity is declining after 1999 due to slower pace 
of IT capital stock growth. 
(Figure 1) 
Do all of these structural changes and IT diffusion lead to higher productivity 
performance at Chinese enterprises? In order to address this question, we use the 
following TFP index at each firm “i” and time “t”. 
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where VA, EMP and CAP are value added, number of employment and capital stock,  9
respectively for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’. sEMP is the shares of labor compensation, i.e., the 
ratio of total wage to value added for industry ‘j’. It should be noted that the share is an 
industry average at 2 digit industry code. In addition, 
j
t i X ,   is an average of X in 
industry ‘j’. This TFP index indicates relative productivity of each firm within each 
industry, and it is widely used in literature on the relationship between market dynamics 
of productivity. (Baily et. al, 1992)   
Constant price value added is constructed by double deflation method, using output 
deflator for gross output and input deflator for intermediate inputs. Output deflators are 
taken from Chinese Statistical Yearbook, and input deflators are calculated by using 
1997 benchmark IO table as weighted average of output deflators for each industry. 
Constant price capital stock is based on book value of capital stock for structure and 
machinery in 1995. Current price gross investment is estimated by the following 
equation.  
t p t t p t t p t I CAP CAP = + = = + + = , 1 , , 1 * δ   
t p t I t p t t p t t p t p CAP CAP CAP ~ , 1 , , 1 , 1 , / ) * ( * + = + = + = − + = δ δ       ( 2 )  
where CAPt,p=s is constant price capital stock at year ‘t’ using the price at base year “s”, 
δ is the rate of depreciation and PI is investment price. Capital stocks for structure and 
machinery are estimated individually, assuming service life of structure for 40 years and 
machinery for 16 years. Investment prices for both type of capital are taken from 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 
Moving to comparison between three types of enterprises, the exit, the entry and the 
continuous, for given period we defined the exit as those enterprises that exist in the 
starting year but disappeared in finishing year, while we define the entry as those don’t 
exist in the starting year but appeared in the finishing year. And naturally, the 
continuous are defined as enterprises that existing in both the starting and finishing 
years of the given period. Across these types of firms, the following three indicators on 
productivity and IT are compared.   
・ TFP: relative TFP index as is defined in equation (1) 
・ ITCAPD: dummy variable that takes 1 if the enterprise has IT capital stock and 
takes 0 if not (mean of this indicator shows the share of firms with IT capital)  10
・ ITCAPR: a ratio of amount of IT capital stock to total capital stock, and it is zero if 
the enterprise has no IT capital stock at all.   
Table 4 shows the relative value of these three indicators for the entry and the exit to the 
continuous. The calculation in the table is made by ownership of enterprise, aiming to 
see if the comparison varies by ownership of enterprise and also for three periods, 
1995-98, 1999-2002 and 1995-2002.  
(Table 4) 
As can be seen from the table, with very few exceptions the TFP performance is lower 
in the exit and higher in the entry compared with the continuous enterprises. Therefore, 
enterprise reform such as an ownership change from SOEs to stock holding companies 
has conducted for relatively low productivity firm. In addition, it can be said that the 
firm after such reform is relatively higher in its productivity. In contrast to TFP, no clear 
pattern can be found in ITCAPD and ITCAPR.   
(Table 5) 
Similar comparison is made by industry in Table 5. Briefly speaking, the same patters 
observed for ownership are also observed for industry. That is, in almost all of sectors, 
the exit has lower TFP performance but the entry has higher TFP performance compared 
with the continuous. When comparison is made on the base of ITCAPD and ITCAPR, 
there is no clear pattern again. It is found that a firm with substantial reform has not 
used IT in its production process more intensively than a firm without, so that enterprise 
reform itself may know stimulate investment in IT. However, organizational changes 
with better governance mechanism of corporate performance may induce effective use 
of existing IT facilities. This relationship of IT, enterprise reform and productivity is 
analyzed in the following section.         
4.  Regression analysis 
In this section, production function is estimated in order to analyze impact of IT and 
enterprise reform on productivity of Chinese manufacturing firms. By treating IT capital 
services explicitly in the production function framework, factor contribution of IT as 
well as its impact on factor neutral TFP can be evaluated. The following Cob Douglas 
production function with error component structure is considered as a base.   
it it EMP it nonIT it IT it u EMP nonIT IT VA + + + = ln ln ln ln α α α      (3) 
it it it it e a u ε + + =            11
where VA, IT, non-IT and EMP is constant price value added, IT capital stock, non-IT 
capital stock and number of employment, respectively. Error terms of equation (3) can 
be decomposed into  it a : firm specific factors for firm’s performance, such as 
managerial capabilities and workers’ motivation,  it e : exogenous shocks for firm’s 
performance, such as macro economic business cycle, and  it ε :error terms associated 
with measurement errors. Typically, a better firm invests more and employs more,  it a  
is positively correlated to explanatory variables, so that their coefficients have upward 
bias when equation (3) is estimated by OLS. In this case, a fixed effect model by 
assuming  it a  as time invariant components ( i it a a = ), is commonly used. (Griliches 
and Mairesse, 1995) 
In order to capture the impact of IT and enterprise reform on productivity, an equation 
(3) is extended to the following as models to be estimated in this section. 
it it exit it ent
exit ent it EMP it nonIT it IT it
u ITCAPR Exit ITCAPR Ent
t Exit t Ent EMP nonIT IT VA
+ + +
+ + + + =
* *
* * * * ln ln ln ln
γ γ
β β α α α
 (4) 
it it i it e a u ε + + =  
As in shown in the previous section, enterprise reform such as corporatising state owned 
enterprises can be captured as exit of SOE and entry of stock holding enterprise in this 
dataset. While it is impossible to link between exiting firm and entry one, enterprise 
reform can be evaluated by comparing entry and exit firms to continuing ones. In 
equation (4) ENT is a dummy variable whether a firm enters the observations from 
1995 to 2002. On the other firms, EXIT is a dummy variable for a firm’s exit from the 
observations during the same period. Both dummy variables are multiplied by time 
trend “t”, in order to keep these dummies even after fixed effect transformation. 
Therefore,  β s reflect the difference of TFP growth, instead of level, as compared to 
continuing firms for all periods of panel dataset. Equation (4) also has explanatory 
variables of cross terms of these dummies with ITCAPR, which is the ratio of IT capital 
stock to total capital stock These cross terms can capture the degree of complementarity 
or substitutionality of IT and enterprise reforms for productivity. 
Regression results using all samples are shown in Table 6. Model (1) to Model (3) are 
results from basic specifications, as is described in equation (1). It is found that IT 
capital contributes significantly to value added. When comparing model (2) and model 
(3), the output elasticity of IT capital increases over time. Coefficients of model (2) and 
(3) are relatively smaller than those of model (1). Fixed effect transformation of panel 
data can cause downward bias to estimated coefficients with measurement errors, and  12
such bias become larger for shorter panel in general (Griliches and Hausman, 1984). 
This may be the case for our estimates as well.   
(Table 6) 
In model (4)-(6), only dummies for entry and exit are added to model (1)-(3). As is 
shown in Model (4), entry firms outperform continuing ones by TFP growth, while exit 
firms are in slower productivity growth. This finding suggests enterprise reforms, in a 
sense of shutting down of low productivity firms, and ownership reforms of the other 
firms, have worked. Furthermore, it is found that the impact of exit of lower 
productivity firms is larger in the first half, while contribution of entry firms on 
productivity growth can be particularly found in the later half of this sample.   
Finally, model (7)-(9) are full models using equation (2). Sings of coefficients to ENT 
and EXIT are almost same as those of model (4)-(6). One of major findings from these 
models is a positive and significant coefficient to the cross term of entry and IT 
intensity (ITCAPR). Entry contributes to TFP positively, and the degree of this positive 
impact becomes larger when this firm’s IT intensity is higher. In this sense, enterprise 
reform and IT are complementary to productivity growth at firm level. This is consistent 
to our hypothesis that efficiency gain from IT needs proper incentive mechanism to 
achieve higher productivity. Enterprise reform via corporatising SOEs and joint venture 
with foreign own companies, is essential to have the power of IT enable to be shown up.   
In order to look into this point in mode detail, Table 7 gives regression result of 
equation (4) by type enterprise ownership. First, positive and significant coefficients to 
ITCAP can be found all types, except for T-HK-M firms and private ones. According to 
high coefficients to EMP for T-HK-M firms, they concentrate in labor intensive 
industry, where the role of IT is relatively small. Private firms are emerging recently, 
and there may be a problem with small sample size.   
(Table 7) 
On the other hand, entry firms achieved higher productivity performance in all 
categories. In addition, exit firms are lower in the productivity growth, except for 
private firms. It can be said that enterprise reforms captured by entry and exit in our 
samples contribute to productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing industries. As for 
the cross term of ENTRY with ITCAPR, positive and significant coefficients can be 
found in SOEs and stock holding companies. For these companies, as well as 
contribution of entry of new firms, they achieved better productivity performance, as IT  13
intensity becomes higher. Positive coefficients can be found in collective, foreign 
owned and private firms, but they are not statistically significant.   
Table 8 shows the same regression result by industry and location of firms. 14 types of 
industry classification in Table 2 are aggregated three types. The first category is state 
owned sector including mining, petrochemical, primary metals and utilities. These 
heavy and energy related industries used to be managed by the state, and has been gone 
through SOE reforms. The second one is machinery sector, including fabricated metals, 
general machinery, transportation equipments, electrical and electronics, which are 
relatively new and not so heavily regulated industries. Finally, the third one includes the 
other industries. In model (5) and (6), all samples are divided into urban and local 
group, and regressions are conducted separately. Urban group includes firms located in 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong, and local groups 
are those in the rest of region. 
(Table 8) 
In all types of industry, IT capital has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. 
The size of output elasticity is larger for machinery sector, due to its higher IT capital 
intensity. It is also found that ENTRY firms achieved higher productivity growth than 
continuing ones. It should be noted that this is the case for state sector, where entry and 
exit of enterprises are, presumably, associated with SOE reforms in most cases. On the 
other hand, there should be substantial green field entries in machinery sector, so that 
positive coefficients with ENTRY in model (2) may come from these new entrants. In 
all models, the cross term of ENTRY and ITCAPR is positive. Although statistically 
significant coefficient at 5% level can be found only in other manufacturing group, it 
should be noted that the other two are significant at 10% level. As for regional 
breakdown, there cannot be found a big difference. IT capital’s contribution to value 
added, productivity effect of entry and exit, and complementarity of enterprise reform 
and IT can be found both in urban and local areas.   
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, the impact of enterprise reforms and IT on productivity is investigated by 
using micro-data for Chinese manufacturing firms from 1995 to 2002. In our dataset, 
substantial enterprise reforms, typically happened in SOE reforms such as corporatizing 
as well as joint venturing with foreign capitals, can be captured by entry of exit of firms. 
Tremendous structural changes in terms of firm’s ownership can be observed in Chinese 
manufacturing sector, which is driven by entry and exit of firms, instead of relative  14
importance of continuing firms. It is found that exiting firms (pre-reform firms) are 
lower in productivity than continuing ones, while entering firms (post-reform firms) are 
higher. Therefore, it can be said that enterprise reforms in China has a positive impact 
on aggregated productivity growth.   
On the other hand, the IT intensity in entry firms is not always higher than that of 
continuing firms. Production facility of post reform enterprises is not so modern at the 
outset. However, complementarity of IT and enterprise reform for productivity can be 
found. One of interpretation of this finding is that post reform enterprises have better 
incentive structure to improve productivity by using information technology. Or, 
another interpretation can be post reform enterprises are better equipped with intangible 
capital for efficient use of IT, such as performance based incentive system and flatter 
organizational structure. Identification of factors behind this complementarity between 
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Table 1: The change in ownership composition of value added from 1995 to 2002 
 
 
Table2: Shares of state-owned enterprises in total value added by industry 
industry 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 99.0 96.6 96.5 97.9 96.2 51.1 22.6 31.7
Food and tabacco 81.4 79.6 78.7 73.7 67.7 60.6 57.1 60.4
Texitile 51.6 43.3 44.5 40.7 35.4 32.9 24.3 20.8
Leather, paper, wood 52.6 46.1 40.8 36.2 29.6 27.3 20.4 17.2
Petrochemical 96.1 92.7 90.7 90.6 87.3 58.5 32.4 22.9
Chemical (exc. Drugs) 60.7 58.1 52.9 46.1 42.9 38.3 32.2 24.6
Drug 54.8 51.6 47.0 42.9 42.3 33.3 27.4 13.4
Primary metals 80.1 79.0 79.7 74.6 68.7 59.4 55.4 46.5
Fabricated metals 34.6 34.6 32.7 29.7 27.4 22.8 16.5 13.5
Machinery 64.9 64.4 59.9 50.1 46.3 39.6 32.5 28.3
Transportation 66.9 60.6 60.2 55.4 51.2 45.7 42.2 33.3
Electrical and electronics 32.7 35.0 26.3 29.7 19.3 18.2 10.6 12.8
Other manufacturing 5.5 12.8 7.1 7.3 5.7 9.7 2.0 -4.0
Utilities 83.0 79.9 74.2 71.4 70.0 68.4 63.0 59.0  
 
 




1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
State-owned  15,718  15,085  14,409  13,177  11,011  10,125  8,857  7,851 
Collective-owned  4,022  4,230  4,126  3,596  3,345  3,087  2,482  2,201 
HK, M, TW  950  1,142  1,217  1,456  1,527  1,584  2,220  2,479 
Foreign  1,058  1,355  1,548  1,593  1,947  2,117  2,664  3,016 
Stockholding  965  1,109  1,724  2,757  3,378  4,092  5,500  6,030 
Private  4  14  34  173  308  476  936  1,263 
Others  287  290  288  210  155  175  126  149 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
State-owned  73.3  70.1  67.8  64.0  59.3  46.9  36.3  34.2 
Collective-owned  7.9  9.5  8.5  8.1  7.8  6.8  5.3  4.7 
HK, M, TW  4.3  5.1  5.5  6.4  7.2  7.4  9.4  9.9 
Foreign  7.0  7.6  8.5  9.0  10.6  11.6  14.6  15.9 
Stockholding  6.8  7.1  9.0  11.9  14.2  26.2  32.5  33.1 
Private  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.7  0.8  1.5  2.0 






Table 4: Comparison of TFP and IT investment between the exit, the entry and the 
continuous by ownership of enterprises 
Periods
Type of
enterprise Variables SOE Collective T-HK-M Foreign Sharehold Private Others
TFP -0.062 0.017 0.115 -0.086 -0.031 0.103 0.139
ITCAPD -0.050 -0.039 -0.141 0.038 -0.088 0.000 0.250
ITCAPR -0.011 -0.013 -0.122 -0.010 -0.009 0.000 0.078
TFP 0.163 0.123 -0.019 0.177 0.079 0.202 0.552
ITCAPD -0.113 -0.014 -0.170 -0.192 -0.201 0.214 0.005
ITCAPR -0.012 0.003 -0.042 -0.020 -0.042 0.011 0.083
TFP -0.183 -0.019 -0.088 0.210 -0.039 0.237 0.107
ITCAPD -0.105 -0.051 0.010 0.076 -0.096 -0.063 -0.228
ITCAPR -0.003 -0.018 -0.098 0.022 -0.032 -0.028 -0.009
TFP 0.089 0.369 0.204 0.105 -0.106 0.141 0.315
ITCAPD -0.089 -0.208 -0.082 -0.045 0.083 0.114 -0.334
ITCAPR 0.028 -0.064 -0.042 -0.001 -0.033 0.030 -0.007
TFP -0.186 -0.031 0.112 -0.042 -0.208 0.103 -0.025
ITCAPD -0.100 -0.070 -0.186 0.222 -0.094 0.000 0.048
ITCAPR -0.007 -0.005 -0.177 -0.052 -0.009 0.000 0.060
TFP 0.027 0.302 0.006 0.100 -0.101 1.498 0.075
ITCAPD 0.030 -0.079 -0.171 -0.165 -0.070 0.427 -0.157












Table 5: Comparison of TFP and IT investment between the exit, the entry and the 
continuous by sector between 1995-2002 
TFP ITCAPD ITCAPR TFP ITCAPD ITCAPR
Mining -0.4600 0.0396 0.0056 0.1632 0.2173 -0.0414
Food and tabacco 0.0075 -0.0308 -0.0667 -0.0775 0.1012 -0.0138
Texitile -0.1672 -0.0732 -0.0052 0.1730 -0.0329 -0.0046
Leather, paper, wood -0.1397 -0.2029 -0.0440 0.0494 -0.0689 -0.0544
Petrochemical -0.4134 -0.1453 -0.0367 0.3500 -0.0069 0.0745
Chemical (exc. Drugs) -0.1828 -0.1444 0.0193 0.2047 -0.0859 0.0327
Drug -0.1919 0.0847 0.0304 -0.2263 0.2323 -0.0153
Primary metals -0.0145 -0.1913 -0.0050 0.3073 -0.0026 0.0224
Fabricated metals -0.1580 -0.1388 0.0048 0.0977 -0.0615 0.0181
Machinery -0.0438 -0.1048 -0.0134 0.2434 -0.1164 0.0160
Transportation -0.0456 -0.1806 0.0060 0.4124 -0.2657 0.0622
Electrical and electronics -0.0959 -0.0035 -0.0432 0.1987 -0.1812 -0.0265
Other manufacturing 0.0289 -0.0523 -0.0268 0.2535 0.0344 -0.0727
Utilities -0.0079 0.0185 -0.0654 -0.0584 -0.0629 0.0059
Industry
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Table 6: Regression results for all samples 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All year=<98 year>=99 All year=<98 year>=99 All year=<98 year>=99
emp 0.322 0.431 0.289 0.336 0.410 0.312 0.333 0.410 0.308
(27.23)** (17.97)** (15.52)** (28.01)** (16.97)** (16.71)** (27.66)** (16.96)** (16.47)**
itcap 0.045 0.016 0.034 0.041 0.020 0.028 0.034 0.019 0.019
(17.11)** (3.69)** (8.03)** (15.31)** (4.48)** (6.64)** (11.65)** (3.99)** (3.91)**
nonitcap 0.248 0.139 0.198 0.232 0.163 0.176 0.251 0.164 0.203
(30.30)** (9.09)** (16.30)** (27.87)** (10.29)** (14.42)** (27.54)** (9.67)** (14.65)**
entry*t 0.058 0.004 0.072 0.057 0.005 0.071
(15.63)** (0.27) (12.30)** (15.17)** (0.34) (12.04)**
exit*t -0.020 -0.041 -0.012 -0.021 -0.041 -0.012
(4.93)** (5.64)** (0.87) (5.10)** (5.66)** (0.88)
entry*itcapr 0.255 -0.130 0.270
(4.66)** (0.92) (3.85)**
exit*itcapr 0.107 0.056 0.103
(1.60) (0.57) (0.81)
Constant 4.604 5.064 5.663 4.621 4.938 5.592 4.468 4.936 5.367
(39.04)** (22.32)** (31.32)** (39.30)** (21.68)** (30.96)** (36.86)** (21.19)** (28.46)**
Observations 63916 30139 33777 63916 30139 33777 63916 30139 33777
Number of id 23942 15365 16475 23942 15365 16475 23942 15365 16475
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Table 7: Regression results by type of firm ownership 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SOE Collective T,HK,M Foreign Stock Private
emp 0.229 0.438 0.609 0.545 0.406 0.482
(13.49)** (12.67)** (10.30)** (11.29)** (13.54)** (4.98)**
itcap 0.029 0.041 0.014 0.073 0.017 -0.021
(7.26)** (4.79)** (0.95) (6.12)** (2.11)* (0.54)
nonitcap 0.288 0.210 0.071 0.196 0.227 -0.009
(21.20)** (7.40)** (2.17)* (6.81)** (9.77)** (0.08)
entry*t 0.043 0.049 0.061 0.096 0.046 0.091
(7.02)** (4.41)** (3.83)** (7.49)** (5.77)** (2.49)*
exit*t -0.026 -0.004 -0.064 -0.046 -0.006 0.094
(4.74)** (0.35) (2.61)** (1.96)* (0.45) (1.14)
entry*itcapr 0.325 0.085 -0.165 0.097 0.319 0.069
(2.94)** (0.54) (0.96) (0.68) (2.61)** (0.14)
exit*itcapr 0.181 0.134 0.120 -0.403 0.343 0.047
(1.74) (0.83) (0.52) (1.81) (1.89) (0.04)
Constant 4.651 4.139 5.342 3.959 4.596 6.529
(25.13)** (12.23)** (10.63)** (9.71)** (15.66)** (5.04)**
Observations 34613 7532 4062 5364 10859 960
Number of id 12527 3538 1934 2395 5269 669
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.12
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   19
 
Table 8. Regression results by industry and location 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State Machinery Other Urban Local
emp 0.319 0.329 0.336 0.433 0.250
(11.29)** (17.81)** (17.13)** (24.67)** (15.23)**
itcap 0.028 0.049 0.026 0.036 0.032
(4.83)** (9.28)** (5.81)** (8.10)** (8.21)**
nonitcap 0.264 0.256 0.234 0.223 0.277
(14.83)** (15.98)** (16.45)** (17.50)** (21.42)**
entry*t 0.032 0.089 0.042 0.064 0.049
(4.16)** (13.84)** (7.18)** (12.07)** (9.37)**
exit*t -0.020 -0.033 -0.011 -0.025 -0.017
(2.44)* (4.81)** (1.63) (4.16)** (3.04)**
entry*itcapr 0.260 0.160 0.307 0.136 0.385
(1.86) (1.73) (3.89)** (1.88) (4.61)**
exit*itcapr 0.161 0.087 0.097 0.095 0.113
(0.87) (0.76) (1.04) (1.05) (1.15)
Constant 4.516 4.208 4.767 4.232 4.665
(17.13)** (20.58)** (25.21)** (24.72)** (27.38)**
Observations 14306 24123 25487 27622 36294
Number of id 5071 8485 10566 10138 13807
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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